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Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: New Tort Problem for the
Mass Media
Robert E. Drechsel*
Negligent infliction of emotional distress is becoming an increasingly popu-
lar cause of action to be utilized against media defendants. This article be-
gins by tracing the development of the tort and explaining its central elements
through cases involving mass media defendants. It studies the relationship
between negligent infliction and the torts of libel, invasion of privacy, and in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. After considering the appropriate
balance between expression and emotional tranquility, it is concluded that
negligent infliction actions present an ominous threat to the free flow of ex-
pression. Sound policy considerations, flowing in part from the first amend-
ment, dictate that such actions be limited. Finally, appropriate limits are
suggested
On August 20, 1980, the Daily Tribune newspaper in Columbia,
Missouri published a story which began as follows:
A 24-year-old Columbia woman told police she was abducted at gunpoint early
this morning, but escaped from her kidnapper's car a few blocks away.
Sandra Kay Hyde, 4334 Bethany Drive, told police the man who forced her
into his car told her: "You will do what I want you to do, or I will blow your
brains out."1
The Columbia Police Department had released the victim's identity
to the newspaper, but the assailant was still at large when the news-
paper published it. Subsequently, the assailant terrorized Ms. Hyde
on several occasions with confrontation and death threats. When Ms.
Hyde sued the city and the newspaper for negligence resulting in
emotional harm, the trial court dismissed the action. However, the
Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, a decision ulti-
mately left undisturbed by the United States Supreme Court.2
Ms. Hyde's suit illustrates a theory of tort liability being advanced
* B.A. (Journalism), 1971; M.A. (Mass Communication), 1976; Ph.D (Mass Com-
munication), 1980, University of Minnesota.
1. Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251, 271 n.26 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
2. Id.
against the mass media by a small but increasing number of plain-
tiffs-negligent infliction of emotional distress [hereinafter negligent
infliction]. Although such actions have been utilized since at least
1921,3 nearly two-thirds of them have arisen within the past five
years.4 One reason for the recent popularity of such actions may well
be that after a century of sluggish and cautious development, the tort
is, becoming increasingly attractive as courts liberalize the rules for
recovery.5 The Supreme Court itself may have provided further im-
petus for negligent infliction actions against the media by finding re-
covery based on negligence consistent with the first amendment, at
least in libel suits brought by private figures.6 Meanwhile, juries
have proved to be antagonistic toward media defendants. 7
Conceivably, a negligent infliction theory of liability could expand
to cover an almost limitless range of media conduct. Possibly, it
could provide a loophole through which plaintiffs-including public
officials and public figures-could circumvent barriers precluding
them from recovery for defamation or invasion of privacy. But per-
haps most significant, expansion of liability for negligent infliction
could "legalize" what heretofore have essentially been questions of
journalistic ethics.
This paper, therefore, examines media liability for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress. The study is confined to cases in which
negligent infliction is advanced as an independent cause of action;
cases in which emotional distress is merely alleged as harm flowing
from another tort such as libel or invasion of privacy are specifically
excluded. The relevant cases are those in which media conduct, even
though without intent to harm, allegedly caused the emotional dis-
tress which was either the only resulting harm or which in turn re-
sulted in some physical manifestation. Cases in which plaintiffs
allege that media negligence led someone to do something dangerous
are not covered by this paper.8
3. Herrick v. Evening Express Pub. Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 A. 16 (1921).
4. See infra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 9-41 and accompanying text.
6. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 n.10 (1974). The Court has
also made it clear that recovery in libel suits may be based on emotional harm. Id at
350.
7. Libel plaintiffs are winning about 80 percent of their trial verdicts. Study
Shows Media Loses Most Jury Libel Rulings, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, April 16, 1983, at
12. Plaintiffs suing for intentional infliction of emotional distress are even more suc-
cessful with juries. Drechsel, Mass Media and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Dis-
tress (1984) (unpublished paper, School of Journalism & Mass Communication,
University of Wisconsin-Madison).
8. Thus, such cases as Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d
488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981), are excluded. In that case, plaintiff argued that NBC
negligently broadcast a movie showing a rape scene that subsequently triggered an imi-
tative real crime against plaintiff. Id. at 491-92, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91.
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TORT
Little more than a century ago, English and American courts re-
fused to recognize mental distress as a recoverable damage except
where such harm was parasitic-that is, where it was part of the
harm caused by a separate, recognizable tort. There could be no suit
either for emotional distress as an independent cause of action, or
where the only alleged harm was emotional distress. This principle
was clearly stated in the English case of Lynch v. Knight, a slander
case:
Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress,
when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone; though where a mate-
rial damage occurs, and is connected with it, it is impossible a jury, in estimat-
ing it, should altogether overlook the feelings of the party interested. 9
Even when an emotional shock had seemingly obvious and serious
physical consequences, there could be no recovery unless the emo-
tional shock had itself been caused by actual physical impact on the
plaintiff.10
Some courts gradually began to relax these rules. In Bell v. Great
Northern Railway Co., an Irish case, it was held that a plaintiff could
maintain a negligence action where her fright as a passenger on a
runaway train had physical manifestations, even though there had
9. 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863, IX H.L. 577, 598 (1861). The principle that damages for
emotional suffering can be parasitic on other causes of action strongly survives, as the
Gertz libel case well illustrates. See supra note 6. For overviews of the development
of tort recovery for emotional distress, see J. DOOLEY, 1 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY
AND LITIGATION 361-87 (1982); W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON TORTS 54-66, 359-67 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER &
KEETON]; Handford, Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress: Analysis of the Growth
of a Tort, 8 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 1 (1979); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Distur-
bance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); Millard, Intentionally and
Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress: Toward a Coherent Reconciliation, 15 IND. L.
REV. 617 (1982); Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: Making "The Punishment Fit the Crime," 1 U. HAWAII L. REV. 1 (1979); No-
lan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging from
Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583 (1982); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffer-
ing: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939); Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury
and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193 (1944); and Com-
ment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Liability to the Bystander, 11 GON-
ZAGA L. REV. 203 (1975).
10. The decision generally credited for this "impact rule" is Victorian Rys.
Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888), a case in which the plaintiff became ill
after a train nearly struck her buggy when a gatekeeper negligently allowed the buggy
to cross the tracks. Technically, however, the case was decided not by application of
the impact rule but on grounds that the illness was too remote in the chain of causa-
tion for recovery to be allowed. Id. at 225-26.
been no physical impact." And in Wilkinson v. Downton, an Eng-
lish court allowed recovery where a practical joker had intentionally
inflicted emotional distress on the plaintiff which led to serious phys-
ical consequences. 12 Finally, in Dulieu v. White & Sons, an English
court repudiated the impact rule, allowing recovery for damages
where nervous shock alone had physical consequences.' 3 But there
the court also added what was to become an enormously influential
qualification: the nervous shock must arise from the plaintiff's rea-
sonable fear of immediate personal injury to himself or herself.14
This qualification has come to be called the "zone-of-physical-danger"
rule.15 This rule was further expanded in another English case,
Hambrook v. Stokes Brothers, where the court allowed recovery in a
negligence case where the plaintiff was not personally in physical
danger, but feared for the safety of her children because of an acci-
dent she actually witnessed.'6
Although a few late 19th Century American cases allowed recovery
where severe emotional distress was inflicted without impact, but
which led to physical consequences, 17 the courts in general remained
reluctant to allow recovery for emotional distress alone or for physi-
cal harm triggered by the distress. This reluctance received perhaps
its ultimate statement in an 1896 New York decision. Fright alone
could not form the basis of an action the state court of appeals con-
cluded, and therefore a plaintiff could not recover even for injuries
resulting from such fright: "That the result may be nervous disease,
blindness, insanity, or even a miscarriage, in no way changes the
principle."' 8 The court, however, hinted that the rigidity of the im-
11. 26 L.R. Ir. 428 (1890).
12. [1897] 2 Q.B. 57.
13. [1901] 2 K.B. 669.
14. Id. at 675. The plaintiff in Dulieu v. White & Sons was able to satisfy that
qualification. The defendant's servant had negligently driven a van into a public house
where plaintiff, who was pregnant, was behind the bar. The shock caused her to give
birth prematurely and the child was mentally defective. Id. at 676.
15. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 365-66; see also Amaya v. Home Ice,
Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), for a thorough
discussion of the rule.
16. [1925] 1 K.B. 141. Plaintiff, who was pregnant, began hemorrhaging and ulti-
mately died after perceiving that her children were in the path of a runaway lorry. Id.
at 141-43.
17. Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892) (fright suf-
fered as result of streetcar mishap led to convulsions, illness and miscarriage); Hill v.
Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890) (recovery allowed where woman suffered mis-
carriage after observing violent assault).
18. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 109-10, 45 N.E. 354, 354 (1896),
overruled by Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961). In Mitchell, the
plaintiff was on a public street when she was nearly struck by a negligently run team
of horses. She was actually standing with her head between the horses' heads when
the team stopped, and she became unconscious, ill and suffered a miscarriage. A year
later, the Massachusetts Supreme Court reached the same conclusion. Spade v. Lynn
& B. & Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 8 (1897).
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pact rule-that is, the requirement that the emotional distress itself
be caused by physical contact-might be relaxed if a defendant's con-
duct were intentional.19 While a state supreme court relaxed the im-
pact rule as early as 1902,20 as late as 1916 the United States Supreme
Court noted that, at least under federal common law, there could be
no recovery for mental suffering alone.21 The impact rule saw its
most absurd expression in 1928 when the Georgia Court of Appeals,
in order to justify an award for mental suffering, found the requisite
impact to have occurred when a dancing circus horse emptied its
bowels onto plaintiff's lap.22
By the 1930's, the principle that plaintiffs could recover for mental
distress without impact or even subsequent physical manifestation,
when defendants intentionally inflicted the distress, was spread-
ing 23 -So much so that by 1939 Dean William Prosser felt confident
in declaring that "[ilt is time to recognize that the courts have cre-
ated a new tort. . . . It is something very like assault. It consists of
the intentional, outrageous infliction of mental suffering in an ex-
treme form."24 Most jurisdictions now recognize an independent
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.25
Although the impact rule began to fall into disuse,26 most courts
remained unwilling to significantly broaden liability for harm result-
ing from negligently inflicted emotional distress. Some jurisdictions
allowed recovery where the emotional distress obviously caused seri-
ous physical consequences and where the plaintiff had been within
the zone of physical danger.27 Those concessions, however, hardly
19. 45 N.E. at 354.
20. Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, 89 N.W. 1068 (1902).
21. Southern Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612, 615 (1916).
22. Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 58, 144 S.E. 680 (1928).
23. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W.2d 428 (1930) (recovery al-
lowed where defendants threatened to hang plaintiff if he did not move); Barnett v.
Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932) (recovery allowable for mental
suffering caused by pressure tactics of debt collection agency).
24. Prosser, Intentional Infliction, supra note 9, at 874. The Restatement, how-
ever, still refused to recognize the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (1934).
25. In 1982, Millard counted 38 jurisdictions. Millard, supra note 9, at 631-32. The
Restatement also now recognizes the tort, and favors recovery for intentionally caused
emotional distress even without impact or subsequent physical consequences so long as
the conduct causing the distress is outrageous and the emotional suffering is severe.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
26. A 1982 study found only five jurisdictions still following the impact rule in
negligence cases. Millard, supra note 9, at 618.
27. See supra note 17; Dooley, supra note 9, at 375-76.
made recovery easy.28
Most jurisdictions still refuse to recognize a cause of action specifi-
cally for negligent infliction of emotional distress.29 But where the
tort has been recognized, the rules for recovery appear to be becom-
ing increasingly more liberal. Developments in California and Ha-
waii have been particularly influential. In 1968, in Dillon v. Legg,
California relaxed the "zone-of-physical-danger" rule, although it
still required some physical manifestation of the emotional distress. 30
That decision involved a suit brought by a mother who had witnessed
the death of her child at the hands of a negligent motorist, and sub-
stituted a foreseeability test: "'recovery should be had ... if defend-
ant should foresee fright or shock severe enough to cause substantial
injury in a person normally constituted.' "3' Apparently realizing the
potential expansiveness of this rule, the court specified that plaintiffs
in such "bystander" cases would have to witness a tragedy first-hand
and be closely related to the victim of the tragedy. 32
Two years later, in Rodrigues v. State, the Hawaii Supreme Court
applied a foreseeability test in a case brought by a couple for mental
suffering allegedly resulting from the highway department's failure
to keep a culvert unclogged causing their house to be flooded during
a heavy rain.33 Neither impact nor physical consequence was re-
quired to be shown. Perhaps the most dramatic and influential ex-
tension came from the California Supreme Court in 1980. In Molien
v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, the court held that where a plaintiff
was the direct victim of allegedly negligent conduct resulting in emo-
tional distress, the plaintiff could maintain an action for the emo-
tional distress alone, without impact and without any physical
consequence. 34 Foreseeability of harm was held to be the test, even
28. The rigidity of these rules is well illustrated by Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis.
603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935), where, because the victim of the emotional distress was not
within the zone of physical danger herself, there could be no recovery. The suit was
brought by the estate of a woman who died after the emotional shock of looking out
her window just as the defendant struck and killed her daughter as she crossed a
highway.
29. Millard, supra note 9, at 631-32. Unfortunately, not all authorities agree on
just how many jurisdictions do recognize the tort. See generally, Dooley, supra note 9,
at 375-76; 38 AM. JuR. 2D Frigh4 Shock & Mental Disturbance §§ 1, 25 (1968).
30. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
31. 68 Cal. 2d at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (quoting 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMFs, THE LAW OF TORTS 1035-36 (1956)).
32. Id.
33. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). The same court, however, somewhat stifled
development of the tort in Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 532
P.2d 673 (1975), by refusing to allow recovery by the estate of a plaintiff who died of a
heart attack after being informed by telephone that his daughter and granddaughter
had been killed in an accident. The court concluded that since he was in California
when the accident occurred, he was not sufficiently close to allow recovery.
34. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
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though not in a bystander context.35
The plaintiff in Molien was a man whose wife was misdiagnosed as
having syphilis. The misdiagnosis made his wife suspect him of infi-
delity, and their marriage consequently dissolved. Molien's expansive
principle has subsequently been reflected in decisions in at least five
other states in varying factual contexts-emotional distress suffered
by a motor vehicle accident victim who escaped physical injury,3 6 by
a passenger trapped in a stalled elevator,37 by a mother who saw her
infant son choking on a foreign substance contained in a jar of baby
food,3 8 by a woman whose doctor failed to attend her labor and deliv-
ery,3 9 and by a man driving behind a truck from which a large plate
of glass fell.40
If these cases do signal a trend toward significantly relaxed rules
for recovery in negligent infliction actions, it would seem to be be-
cause the most fundamental concerns about such relaxation are being
overcome. Historically, courts have advanced four fundamental argu-
ments against easing the rules for negligent infliction plaintiffs: 1)
the connection between emotional distress and physical consequence
is too indirect; 2) most emotional distress is trivial harm anyway; 3)
the intangible nature of emotional distress creates serious problems
of proof; and 4) easing the rules for recovery will lead to a flood of
litigation, including many fraudulent claims.41
These concerns seem to have been dismissed by a combination of
scholarship, logic, counter-argument and the careful testing of new
principles. Perhaps the easiest arguments to overcome were those re-
garding the alleged triviality of emotional harm, its susceptibility to
35. Id. at 921-31, 616 P.2d at 816-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834-39. For critical analysis of
the case, see Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Horizons af
ter Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 13 PAC. L.J. 179 (1981); Comment, Negli-
gent Infliction of Emotional Distress as an Independent Cause of Action in California;
Do Defendants Face Unlimited Liability?, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 181 (1982).
36. Chappetta v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 415 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
37. Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983).
38. Culbert v. Sampson's Supermkts., Inc., 444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982). Technically,
however, this was a bystander case.
39. Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, Inc., 400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981).
40. Shultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983).
41. Several authorities and case law decisions have summarized these arguments.
See, e.g., Spade, 168 Mass. at 288-90, 47 N.E. at 89; Mitchell, 151 N.Y. at 110, 45 N.E. at
354-55; Waube, 216 Wis. at 612-15, 258 N.W. at 501; Victorian Rys CommM'rs 13 App.
Cas. at 225-26; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 359-67; Bohen, Right to Recover
for Injury Resulting from Negligence without Impact 50 U. PA. L. REV. 141 (1902); 38
AM. JUR. 2D Fright, Shock, & Mental Disturbance §§ 8-12 (1968); Annot., 64 A.L.R2d
100 (1959).
proof, and its operation as a proximate cause of physical harm. To all
of these assertions, medical evidence and expertise plus common
sense could provide answers. Not only can the physical impact of ex-
citement or fear be felt, but medical and psychological research has
long provided evidence of a connection between emotional and physi-
cal responses.42 As medical and psychological expertise increases,
problems of proof become more manageable. 43 Further, cases involv-
ing the impact rule and the requirement that emotional distress be
manifested by physical consequences have helped the courts learn to
distinguish spurious from legitimate claims, provided some proof of
the seriousness of the harm, and provided some evidence of proxi-
mate cause.
The concern about runaway litigation, however, remains real. Cer-
tainly, the impact rule, the requirement of physical manifestation of
emotional harm, the zone-of-physical-danger test, and even the fore-
seeability rule are all intended to effect some sort of compromise be-
tween justice and the pragmatic need to avoid uncontrolled litigation.
The conscience of the judiciary has also been prodded by such au-
thorities as Dean Prosser, who, in discussing legal remedies for emo-
tional distress, reminded readers that "[i]t is the business of the
courts to make precedent where a wrong calls for redress, even if
lawsuits must be multiplied, and by this time there is precedent
enough, and no such increase in litigation is to be observed."44
Before discussing negligent infliction suits against mass media de-
fendants, one must summarize the relevant legal principles, outline
the basic elements of the tort, and consider the meaning of two cru-
cial concepts-negligence and duty.
II. CENTRAL ELEMENTS OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION
A statement attempting to synthesize the common law might de-
fine the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress as negligent
conduct that is the proximate cause of emotional distress, from which
physical harm may result, in a person to whom the actor owes a legal
duty of care not to be negligent.45
42. See Bohlen, supra note 41; Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage,
20 MICH. L. REV. 497 (1922); Seizer, Psychological Stress and Legal Concepts of Disease
Causation, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 951 (1971); Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34
HARV. L. REV. 260 (1921); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case
for an Independent Tort 59 GEO. L.J. 1237 (1971).
43. See supra note 42.
44. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 359-61.
45. The Restatement takes a generally cautious approach to negligent infliction.
It does not recognize a cause of action for negligence resulting only in emotional dis-
tress. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965). It also suggests a fairly restric-
tive principle of recovery for illness or bodily harm resulting from unintentionally
inflicted emotional distress. Recovery for such illness or harm may be had if the de-
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Negligent infliction cases appear to fall into two broad categories-
those where the plaintiff is the direct victim of the defendant's con-
duct (generally some type of accident), and those where the plaintiff
has been a "bystander" or indirect victim claiming to have been
harmed because of what the defendant did to a third party. In the
direct victim cases, recovery will be allowed in some jurisdictions,
provided the defendant's conduct has indeed been negligent and
there has been physical impact on the plaintiff, physical harm proxi-
mately caused by the defendant's conduct, or foreseeable emotional
distress without impact or physical harm.46 In bystander cases, again
depending on the jurisdiction, recovery will be allowed in two situa-
tions. If the plaintiff was in the zone of physical danger, observed a
close relative's tragedy, and suffered emotional distress manifested in
physical symptoms, he may recover. Alternatively, if the plaintiff
was not in the zone of physical danger, but contemporaneously ob-
served an accident involving a close relative, and suffered severe and
foreseeable emotional distress that may or may not have been mani-
fested physically, a court will allow recovery.47
A related principle, which allows recovery for conduct that is less
than reckless and perhaps even less than negligent, allows recovery
for insults to patrons by employees of public utilities.48 This rule is
based on the law's recognition of a few special relationships between
parties where one party is expected to be especially considerate.
These relationships commonly include those between creditor and
debtor, carrier and passenger, innkeeper and guest, and place of
amusement and patron.49
These principles alone are not helpful without an understanding of
fendant should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing
the emotional distress and should have realized that the distress might result in physi-
cal harm. Id § 313. The Restatement favors recovery for bodily harm resulting where
emotional distress was inflicted intentionally and unreasonably, but such circum-
stances are beyond the scope of this paper. Id §§ 312, 436. In general, courts will not
allow emotional distress damages for mere inconvenience, annoyance or mental sus-
pense. The discomfort must be more severe and intense. 38 AM. Jul. 2D Fright
Shock, & Mental Disturbance §§ 7, 45 (1968).
46. See supra notes 9-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of approaches
taken by various jurisdictions.
47. Id These rules are a result of a long process of evaluation in the common law.
48. The Restatement states the principle as follows: "A common carrier or other
public utility is subject to liability to patrons utilizing its facilities for gross insults
which reasonably offend them, inflicted by the utility's servants while otherwise acting
within the scope of their employment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 48 (1965).
49. 38 AM. Jun. 2D Fright, Shock, & Mental Disturbance §§ 43-44 (1968). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 48 comments a, b and c (1965).
negligence and, concomitantly, duty. The Restatement of the Law of
Torts [hereinafter cited as Restatement], defines negligent conduct as
either:
an act which the actor as a reasonable man should recognize as involving an
unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an interest of another, or a failure
to do an act which is necessary for the protection or assistance of another and
which the actor is under a duty to do.5 0
Negligence thus involves the concepts of the reasonable person and
unreasonable risk. A person's conduct is negligent when, measured
against the standard of a hypothetical reasonable person's conduct
under the same circumstances, it involves an unreasonable risk of
harm to another such that the magnitude of the risk outweighs what
the law regards as the utility of the conduct. If a reasonable person
would have done precisely what the defendant did, or if the risk is
not unreasonable, the conduct is not negligent.
A reasonable person is one who exercises "those qualities of atten-
tion, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment which society requires of
its members for the protection of their own interests and the inter-
ests of others."s1 The crucial inquiry is not how a defendant in fact
assessed a given situation at the time of his or her relevant action,
but rather how a hypothetical reasonable person would have assessed
that same situation. Thus the standard is objectively, not subjec-
tively, established.52 Consequently, no matter how innocent or harm-
less a defendant might have believed his conduct to be, it might still
fall short of the conduct of a reasonable person.
A risk becomes unreasonable when it outweighs the utility of a de-
fendant's action.53 Utility itself may depend on such factors as the
social value the law attaches to the interest being advanced or pro-
tected by a defendant's conduct, the likelihood that this interest will
in fact be advanced or protected by the defendant's conduct, and the
likelihood that the interest can be adequately advanced or protected
by a less dangerous course of conduct. 54 On the other side of the bal-
ance, the magnitude of a risk depends on such factors as the social
value the law attaches to the imperiled interests, the likelihood that
the defendant's conduct will invade another interest, the extent of
the harm likely to be caused, and the number of people likely to be
affected55 The greater the social value of the threatened interest,
the less risk is justifiable.56
What this suggests, of course, is that the concepts of reasonable
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 284 (1965).
51. I& § 283 comment b.
52. Id, § 283 comment c.
53. I& § 291.
54. I& § 292.
55. Id. § 293.
56. I& § 293 comment a.
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person, unreasonable risk and social utility are flexible and variable.
The Restatement recognizes this flexibility: "If the legal valuation
differs from that attached to the respective interests by a persistent
and long-continued course of public conviction, as distinguished from
a novel and possibly ephemeral opinion, courts should and often do
re-examine their valuation and make it conform to the settled popu-
lar opinion."57
The same could be said about the concept of legal duty. No matter
how much harm one might cause, if the law does not recognize a
legal duty to refrain from causing such harm, then the victim cannot
legally complain. As Dean Prosser has observed:
[A]s our ideas of human relations change the law as to duties has changed
with them. Various factors undoubtedly have been given conscious or uncon-
scious weight, including convenience of administration, capacity of the parties
to bear the loss, a policy of preventing future injuries, the moral blame at-
tached to the wrongdoer, and many others. Changing social conditions lead
constantly to the recognition of new duties. No better general statement can
be made, than that the courts will find a duty where, in general, reasonable
men would recognize it and agree that it exists.
5 8
Consequently, at least in some cases, whether a duty exists may be
impossible to discern until the case is adjudged.59
In the context of actions for plaintiffs' emotional distress, most ju-
risdictions in essence agree that there is a duty not to intentionally
inflict such harm. Fewer courts agree that there is a duty not to
cause such harm negligently, but the number is growing.60 When-
ever a court seeks to expand liability for negligence resulting in emo-
tional distress, it implicitly or explicity addresses the duty question.
Thus, the Hawaii Supreme Court in Rodrigues aptly noted that, in
determining the existence of a duty, it must "weigh the considera-
tions of policy which favor the plaintiff's recovery against those
which favor limiting the defendant's liability."61 The court then de-
clared that "there is a duty to refrain from the negligent infliction of
serious emotional distress."62
Seen in the light of the concepts of negligence and duty, then, de-
vices such as the impact rule, the physical manifestation require-
57. Id § 291 comment d.
58. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 359.
59. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1025
(1928).
60. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. See also Annot., 64 A.L.R.2D
100,109-10 (1959).
61. 52 Hawaii at 166, 472 P.2d at 519.
62. Id, at 167, 472 P.2d at 520.
ment, and the zone-of-physical-danger rule can be understood as
useful in helping to ascertain not only whether a duty exists, but also
the standard of care expected of a reasonable person, and the unrea-
sonableness of the risk. One can likewise see how greater uncer-
tainty and unpredictability enter the equation as the courts move
away from these relatively easy-to-apply rules and toward a more
flexible foreseeability standard.
III. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION AND MASS MEDIA DEFENDANTS
Suits against media defendants for negligent infliction can be
traced to at least 1921, when a newspaper in Maine was sued by a
plaintiff whose son's photograph had mistakenly been published with
a report of the death of another person having the same name.63 The
trial court sustained the newspaper's demurrer. It was upheld by the
Maine Supreme Court on the ground that recovery for emotional dis-
tress or subsequent illness was barred in any negligence action where
there was no physical injury.64 Similar facts-a false newspaper re-
port that plaintiffs' father had died-led to a negligent infliction ac-
tion in 1937 against a New Mexico newspaper. 65 This time, however,
one of the plaintiffs had subsequently suffered a heart attack, and an-
other had become ill. Nevertheless, the state supreme court upheld
dismissal of the case, holding that damages could not be recovered
from a newspaper publisher "for the consequences of grief resulting
in physical injury, occasioned by reading in such paper a negligently
published false report of the death of the reader's parent."66 The re-
sult in both cases was, of course, consistent with the courts' ever-
present reluctance to allow recovery for harm inflicted merely by
emotional distress.67
63. Herrick v. Evening Express Pub. Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 A. 16 (1921).
64. Id. at 139-40, 113 A. at 17. This principle was overruled nearly 50 years later in
Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117, 121 (Me. 1970), a case which
was later held not binding in Culbert v. Sampson's Supermkts., Inc., 444 A.2d 433, 436
(Me. 1982).
65. Curry v. Journal Pub. Co., 41 N.M. 318, 68 P.2d 168 (1937).
66. Id. at 330, 68 P.2d at 176. Secondary sources indicate that several actions were
brought against CBS for physical and emotional damages allegedly caused by the noto-
rious Mercury Theatre radio broadcast of War of the Worlds. W. PALEY, As IT HAP-
PENED 112 (1979), Houseman, The Men from Mars, HARPER'S, Dec. 1948, at 74, 82.
Houseman wrote that none of the suits "was substantiated or legally proved." Id. At
least one legal commentator argued that, under a negligence theory, CBS should be
held responsible for fright-induced physical illness caused by the broadcast. Note,
Broadcasting-'Invasion from Mars'--Recovery for Fright Without Impact, 10 AIR L.
REV. 192 (1939).
67. There are more recent examples of unsuccessful negligent infliction actions
against media defendants. See, e.g., Saunders v. Air Florida Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1233
(D.D.C. 1983) (suit by father who via television witnessed injuries sustained by son
who was killed by defendant's crashing airliner); Beresky v. Techner, 64 Ill. App. 3d
848, 381 N.E.2d 979 (1978) (suit by parents against newspaper which published series of
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Until recently, plaintiffs' successes had been limited to one seem-
ingly aberrant default judgment.6 8 But since 1982, three cases have
resulted in success for plaintiffs, if success can be defined to include
refusal or reversal of dismissal or summary judgment. In the first,
Hyde v. City of Columbia, the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed
the dismissal of a suit by a woman who, while the assailant remained
at large, was identified by a newspaper as a kidnapping victim.6 9 The
assailant thus discovered her identity and was able to terrorize her
on several occasions.7 0 In the second, Parnell v. Booth Newspapers,
Inc., a federal district court refused to grant summary judgment to a
newspaper that had published a retouched but allegedly still identifi-
able photograph of the plaintiff in connection with articles on prosti-
tution.71 In the third, Rubinstein v. New York Post, a New York
court refused to dismiss a suit based on an erroneous report of plain-
tiff's death. 72 None of these successful suits was ultimately decided
by a jury, although there has been one directed verdict for a
defendant.73
Not surprisingly, plaintiffs' success has depended on the courts'
consideration of such issues as defendants' legal duty, impact or phys-
ical manifestation of emotional distress, foreseeability of harm, the
relevance of defenses applicable to companion causes of action, and
first amendment concerns. Each of these concerns deserves closer
attention.
articles regarding death of son from drug overdose). This article does not address
cases in which plaintiffs have sued non-media defendants for emotional distress suf-
fered because of information communicated to them through the media.
68. Blinick v. Long Island Daily Press Pub. Co., 67 Misc. 2d 254, 323 N.Y.S.2d 853
(Civ. Ct. 1971), appeal dismissed, 71 Misc. 2d 986, 337 N.Y.S.2d 859 (Sup. Ct. 1972). De-
fault judgment was entered against a newspaper and advertiser where an advertise-
ment erroneously listed plaintiff's phone number and urged single adults to call for an
"interesting recorded message" and to meet new people "preselected to please you." A
torrent of calls, many of them obscene, resulted. Judgment was $1,750.00 against the
newspaper, $2,500.00 against the advertiser. Unfortunately, the courts were less than
clear on precisely what theory of liability was being pursued. Id.
69. 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
70. Id at 253.
71. 572 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
72. 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1581 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1983). The court mentioned
neither the Herrick nor the Curry case. It did, however, cite an unpublished New
York case, LeBrecque v. New York News, Inc., N.Y. L.J., April 4, 1979, at 12 (Civ. Ct.).
73. Cole v. Dun & Bradstreet Pubs. Corp., No. 80-1015, slip op. (6th Cir., Oct. 22,
1981) (unpublished slip opinion). The federal appeals court upheld the directed verdict
in a suit by a woman whom Dun's Review identified as the "ex-wife" of a man to
whom she was still married. Id.
A. Duty
As might be expected, there is a strong correlation between plain-
tiffs' successes and whether courts find journalists to owe plaintiffs
any legal duty, although nearly half the decisions neither explicitly
nor implicitly address the question.
For example, in Curry v. Journal Publishing Co.,74 the conclusion
that the paper owed no legal duty to third persons, or to plaintiffs75
was central to the court's finding that the newspaper was not legally
responsible for emotional harm to third persons not directly involved
in the allegedly offensive story. And in rejecting a suit by a reader
upset over another inaccurate story, a federal district court in New
Jersey noted that plaintiff "was not one to whom the defendants
owed any particular duty of care."76 In that case, the plaintiff, under
indictment for murder, brought suit after a newspaper incorrectly re-
ported on a state supreme court decision which, had the story been
correct, would have meant dismissal of the charges against him. As a
result, he claimed to have become wrongly elated and then
despondent.77
On the other hand, in Hyde,78 Parnell,79 Blinick v. Long Island
Daily Press Publishing Co.,80 Apostle v. Booth Newspapers, Inc.,8 1 and
Rubinstein,8 2 courts either explicitly or implicitly agreed that media
defendants owed plaintiffs a legal duty. In Blinick, the court found
that where a newspaper accepted personal ads soliciting phone calls
from single adults "it must likewise accept the concomitant burden of
verifying any telephone number or address given ... *"83 The court
in Rubinstein reached a similar conclusion regarding the publication
of death notices.8 4 Apostle and Parnell both stemmed from a newspa-
per's coverage of prostitution. The plaintiffs in Apostle alleged that
the stories falsely implied that they and their businesses were con-
74. 41 N.M. 318, 68 P.2d 168 (1937).
75. Id. at 327, 68 P.2d at 174.
76. Tumminello v. Bergen Evening Record, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1156, 1159-60 (D.N.J.
1978).
77. Id.
78. 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983).
79. 572 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
80. 67 Misc. 2d 254, 323 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1971), appeal dismissed, 71 Misc. 2d 986, 337
N.Y.S.2d 859 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
81. 572 F. Supp. 897 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
82. 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1581 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1983).
83. 67 Misc. 2d at 256, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
84. 9 MEDIA L. REP. at 1582. To bolster its conclusion, the court cited Johnson v.
State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 334 N.E.2d 590 (1975), a case holding that a
plaintiff had a right to sue for negligence where a hospital mixed up its files and
falsely reported to plaintiff that her mother had died. The court did concede, however,
that hospitals might have a greater duty of care than newspapers. 9 MEDIA L. REP. at
1582.
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nected with prostitution;8 5 whereas the plaintiff in Parnell claimed
she had been falsely connected with prostitution by a retouched pho-
tograph of her used in connection with the articles.86 In both cases,
the plaintiffs alleged that the newspaper had a legal duty to use rea-
sonable care in investigating, verifying accuracy, and following "ac-
ceptable journalistic standards."87 In neither case, however, was the
assertion of legal duty challenged.88
By far the most extensive treatment of the duty question came in
Hyde. There, the plaintiff argued that the reporter and newspaper
owed her a legal duty not to identify her and to protect her from a
foreseeable risk of intentional harm by an assailant when the defend-
ants knew he was still at large and when publication of such informa-
tion was otherwise forbidden by the newspaper's own internal
policy.89 The appellate court agreed, concluding that the publication
of Hyde's name and address was:
a matter of such trivial public concern compared with the high probability of
risk to the victim by their publication, that a news medium owes a duty in
such circumstances to use reasonable care not to give likely occasion for a
third party [assailant still at large] to do injury to the plaintiff by the
publication.90
The court found this duty to derive from several policy considera-
tions: a balance between the public's right to know and the right to
personal security, social consensus that common decency considers
such information of insignificant public importance compared to the
likely injury, and the known character and tendencies of the assail-
ant.91 As for the plaintiff's contention that the newspaper's own pol-
icy was relevant, the court noted that such policy, even though
technically unwritten, indicated a belief that a victim's identity is of
no legitimate public concern and that publication could seriously
harm innocent persons: "A deviation from that industry standard,
therefore, becomes evidence of negligence ....
B. Impact/Physical Manifestation
The impact rule or requirement that emotional distress be physi-
85. 572 F. Supp. 897 (W.D. Mich. 1983).
86. Id at 909.
87. Apostle, 572 F. Supp. at 900; Parnell 572 F. Supp. at 916.
88. The court dismissed Apostle's negligent infliction action on other grounds but
without prejudice. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
89. 637 S.W.2d at 256.
90. Id at 269.
91. Id at 269-70.
92. Id at 269 n.25.
cally manifested has been directly dealt with in several court deci-
sions. This requirement seems to have been instrumental in
defendants' success in four cases, 93 but in two of the states in which
those cases arose, subsequent decisions have rejected the impact or
physical manifestation requirements.94 In at least two other cases,
plaintiffs have been able to allege sufficient physical manifestation to
satisfy that requirement, at least preliminarily.95
C. Foreseeability of Harm
The foreseeability issue has explicitly arisen in several cases, and
appears to have been central in at least three of them. In Curry, the
plaintiff lost in part because the court found that the injury to plain-
tiff was so unlikely and unusual that the newspaper could not possi-
bly, under the reasonable person standard, be expected to have
realized that its error created any appreciable risk.96 On the other
hand, in Blinick the court found that the suggestive nature of the ad-
vertisement in which the error occurred "renders it highly foresee-
able that what happened would happen if the telephone number was
wrong." 97 And in Hyde, the court specifically stated what the rele-
vant test was: whether the defendant knew or had reason to foresee
that the conduct involved an unreasonable risk of injury to another
but failed to protect against that hazard.98
93. See Anderson v. Atlanta Newspapers, 212 Ga. 776, 95 S.E.2d 847 (1956) (demur-
rer upheld in absence of evidence of "property damage" where plaintiff sought relief
for mental anguish allegedly caused by advertising, without plaintiff's permission, of
plaintiff's house for sale "to colored persons"); Herrick v. Evening Express Pub. Co.,
120 Me. 138, 113 A. 16 (1921), overruled by Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc.,
269 A.2d 117, 121 (Sup. Ct. Me. 1970) (no recovery for emotional distress without physi-
cal injury); Langworthy v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 368 S.W.2d 385 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1963) (no
relief for emotional harm without impact where plaintiff was upset by newspaper
story about theft from his home); Cole v. Dun & Bradstreet Pubs. Corp., No. 80-1015
(6th Cir., Oct. 22, 1981, unpublished opinion) (no evidence of major shock or injury).
94. Herrick was specifically overruled by Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants,
Inc., 269 A.2d 117, 121 (Sup. Ct. Me. 1970); the impact rule and physical manifestation
requirements were specifically rejected by the Missouri Supreme Court in Bass v.
Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. 1983), thus undermining the principles applied
in Langworthy.
95. In Apostle, sufficient physical manifestation was alleged by claims of high
blood pressure, chest pains, grinding of teeth, heavy menstrual periods, nervousness,
irritability, depression and withdrawal from socializing. 572 F. Supp. at 901. In
Parnel, the requirement was met by allegations of lost appetite, nausea, tremor,
shakes and reclusion. 572 F. Supp. at 917-18.
96. 41 N.M. at 327, 68 P.2d at 174.
97. 67 Misc. 2d at 256, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
98. 637 S.W.2d at 271. The plaintiffs in Apostle and Parnell both alleged that the
newspaper should have reasonably foreseen the harm the articles and photos allegedly
would cause. Apostle, 572 F. Supp. at 899-900; Parne4 572 F. Supp. at 916. The court
did not further address the issue.
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D. Relevance of Other Defenses
Defendants have attempted to stop negligent infliction claims with
defenses to libel or invasion of privacy. The rationale is that if the
law has found a type of conduct to have such utility that it should be
privileged against suits for libel or invasion of privacy, it should also
be privileged against suits for negligent infliction. Otherwise, con-
duct that would ordinarily be privileged would become actionable.
Precisely such an assertion became central in the Apostle and Parnell
cases. In Apostle, the court agreed that where a negligent infliction
claim is based on the same set of facts as a libel claim and where the
libel claim is subject to an assertion of qualified privilege, as a matter
of law the negligence claim cannot survive. That is, if a showing of
mere negligence would not be sufficient under state law to overcome
the qualified privilege, it would be illogical to allow a plaintiff to cir-
cumvent the privilege with a negligent infliction claim.9 9 The court
then dismissed the negligent infliction claim.' 00 However, the same
argument failed in Parnell because the court believed a factual ques-
tion remained as to whether the state privilege applied when the
newspaper coverage was about prostitution, but not necessarily about
the plaintiff, who argued that she was simply not directly involved in
the issue.101 Obviously, if the privilege was found not to apply be-
cause of such a distinction, it could not be used to bar the negligent
infliction claim. Summary judgment was thus refused.102
The defendants in Hyde pressed a privilege argument on several
fronts. They argued first that the publication of plaintiff's name and
address was privileged as an accurate report of truthful information
contained in public records. The court of appeals replied that, despite
the fact that the police department believed the record to be public,
and despite the fact that the state open records law did not exempt
the police records from disclosure, the information given out by the
police was nevertheless not a public record.103 The court reached
99. 572 F. Supp. at 906. Compare Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 525 F. Supp.
585, 603 (D. Md. 1981) (same standard should be used for defamation and false light
causes of action where plaintiff brings both in single suit); Dresbach v. Doubleday &
Co., Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1285, 1288 (D.D.C. 1981) (same standard should be used for defa-
mation and false light causes of action where plaintiff brings both in single suit).
100. 572 F. Supp. at 906, 909. However, the dismissal was without prejudice because
the court found that the issue of what fault standard should apply to private figure
libel plaintiffs in Michigan was undetermined. Id,
101. 572 F. Supp. at 918.
102. I& at 922.
103. 637 S.W.2d at 263.
this conclusion by reasoning that it would make no sense for the Leg-
islature to have intended to make such a record public.10 4 The court
held that this conclusion also rendered inapplicable the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,105
which held that the first amendment created a privilege protecting
the publication of truthful information obtained from open court
records. 0 6 Cox Broadcasting could further be distinguished, the
court asserted, because Hyde did not involve judicial records.o7
Second, the defendants, analogizing Hyde to an invasion of privacy
action, asserted a newsworthiness/public interest defense. The court
rejected that argument on the grounds that Hyde was simply not a
libel or privacy action.' 08
Finally, the defendants argued that the publication should not be
actionable in view of the Missouri Court of Appeals decision in Hood
v. Naeter Brothers Publishing Co., an emotional distress suit brought
by a witness to a robbery-murder whose identity was publicized while
the suspect remained at large. 09 The Hood court concluded that the
newspaper's action was insufficiently outrageous to support an action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress."0 The Hyde court
found the cases distinguishable precisely because Hood was an inten-
tional infliction, not negligent infliction, suit."' Thus, Hyde's suit
was allowed to proceed.
E. The First Amendment
Surprisingly few negligent infliction decisions have addressed the
first amendment implications of such actions. In only three cases
have courts shown any explicit solicitude for the potential impact of
negligent infliction cases on free expression. In Shifflet v. Thomson
Newspapers, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment
for the defendant in a suit involving a plaintiff upset over publicity
given at a hearing during which he was granted expungement of an
indecent exposure conviction. There, the court rested its decision
squarely on first amendment grounds."l 2 Citing Cox Broadcasting
and two other United States Supreme Court decisions, the court held
that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments would not permit ex-
posing the press to liability for truthfully publishing information re-
104. Id,
105. l& at 264 n.19, 269 n.25.
106. 420 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1975).
107. 637 S.W.2d at 269 n.25.
108. Id, at 264.
109. 562 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
110. Id, at 771.
111. 637 S.W.2d at 269 n.25.
112. 69 Ohio St. 2d 179, 431 N.E.2d 1014 (1982).
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leased to the public in court proceedings and from court records."11s
Cox Broadcasting was also used by a Florida circuit court to justify
summary judgment for a defendant who had revealed the identity of
a rape victim who had testified during a public trial." 4 An even
broader first amendment privilege was suggested by a federal district
court in dismissing a suit brought by a plaintiff disgruntled by inaccu-
rate reporting of a court decision.' 15 The court noted that the state
could not, consistent with the requirements of the first amendment,
impose liability for a negligently untruthful news story:
Accuracy in news reporting is certainly a desideratum, but the chilling effect
of imposing a high duty of care on those in the business of news dissemination
and making that duty run to a wide range of readers or TV viewers would
have a chilling effect which is unacceptable under our Constitution. 11 6
The Missouri Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclusion in
Hyde. The court conceded that Hyde's negligent infliction claim con-
fronted the "paramount social utility of a press free to report on top-
ics of public concern," but found that because Hyde was a private
figure her suit fell "validly within the culminated constitutional bal-
ance struck by Gertz which allows a private redress against a newspa-
per for a negligent publication of information on a theory of fault
free from the proof constraints of New York Times."117
IV. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER TORTS
Given the fact that negligent infliction claims are frequently ac-
companied by alternative claims based on other theories of tort liabil-
113. Id, at 184, 431 N.E.2d at 1018. The court also cited Landmark Communications,
Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308
(1977).
114. Williams v. New York Times, 10 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1494 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
1984).
115. Tumminello v. Bergen Evening Record, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1156, 1159-60 (D.N.J.
1978).
116. Id.
117. 637 S.W.2d at 266-67. The court was referring to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974), which allowed recovery in libel cases by private figures upon proof
of negligence. This is a lesser standard of care than that required of public officials
and public figures who must under New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
meet an actual malice or a recklessness standard. Thus, Hyde provides corroboration
for the concern expressed at the outset of this paper that Gertz may give impetus to
negligent infliction actions. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The only other
decision to discuss the first amendment extensively in a negligent infliction case was
Curry v. Journal Pub. Co., 41 N.M. 318, 68 P.2d 168 (1937), but that court sidestepped
facing the first amendment issue directly.
ity,118 and given the possible relevance of other tort defenses to
negligent infliction," 9 it becomes important to compare negligent in-
fliction and related causes of action. What, then, are the salient simi-
larities and differences between negligent infliction and libel, the
various strains of invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress?
A. Libel
Although negligent infliction and libel both involve alleged emo-
tional harm, which may stem from falsehoods and require some
showing of fault,120 there are substantial differences between the two
theories. No jurisdiction requires a libel plaintiff to meet physical
impact or manifestation standards. Nor does a negligent infliction
plaintiff have to allege reputational harm. In fact, there is no reason
to believe that negligent infliction plaintiffs must wait until some-
thing is published before suing.'21 Conceivably, the negligent con-
duct might involve a journalist's newsgathering method.
In libel, the cause of action generally must be personal to the plain-
tiff-that is, the only party who can sue is the one specifically about
whom the defamatory statement was published.122 This requirement
appears to be relaxed for negligent infliction plaintiffs, as many of
the bystander cases and some of the direct victim cases suggest. 2 3
Further, the success of many libel plaintiffs may depend in large part
on whether they are found to be private or public figures, since in
most states private figures need show less fault than public figures. 124
Negligent infliction cases thus far have made no such distinction;
118. See, e.g., Apostle v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 897 (W.D. Mich.
1983).
119. See supra notes 99-117 and accompanying text.
120. In general, private libel plaintiffs must show at least negligence, just as must
plaintiffs in negligent infliction, although public figure and public official libel plain-
tiffs must satisfy a recklessness test. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
121. Fault and damages aside, the fundamental elements of actionable libel are
identification, publication and defamation. See, e.g., D. GILLMOR & J. BARRON, MASS
COMMUNICATION LAw 197-201 (4th ed. 1984); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 771-
85, 797-98.
122. PROSSER & KEETON, SUpra note 9, at 778. Of course there may be some situa-
tions in which two parties stand in such a close relationship that something defama-
tory of one becomes defamatory of both. Id at 778-79.
123. By definition, bystander cases are brought by plaintiffs alleging that they were
indirectly harmed by conduct not specifically directed at or even involving them. Sev-
eral negligent infliction cases have been brought by plaintiffs distraught over publica-
tions concerning a third party. See, e.g., Tumminello v. Bergen Evening Record, Inc.,
454 F. Supp. 1156 (D.N.J. 1978); Beresky v. Teschner, 64 Ill. App. 3d 848, 381 N.E.2d 979
(1978); Herrick v. Evening Express Pub. Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 A. 16 (1921); Curry v.
Journal Pub. Co., 41 N.M. 318, 68 P.2d 168 (1937).
124. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-45 (1974). For a useful summary
of state fault standards for private-figure libel plaintiffs, see 1 COMMUNICATIONS LAw
159 (1983) (PLI course handbook).
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thus, plaintiffs of all types may be able to succeed upon proving neg-
ligence.125 Finally, libel defendants have at their disposal a variety of
powerful defenses-the first amendment, truth, fair comment, quali-
fied privilege and others.126 However, it remains questionable
whether the courts are moving toward finding the same types of de-
fenses applicable to negligent infliction actions.127
B. Privacy
Tort actions for invasion of privacy may be divided into four tradi-
tional categories-appropriation of a plaintiff's name or likeness for
commercial purposes, placing a plaintiff in a false light, disclosing
highly personal facts about a plaintiff, or intruding on a plaintiff's
physical solitude.128 The latter three classes are most relevant to
comparison with negligent infliction. Both theories of liability-inva-
sion of privacy and negligent infliction-seem clearly aimed at pro-
tecting plaintiffs' emotional tranquility. On the other hand, like
libel, privacy actions require no physical impact on the plaintiff or
any physical manifestation of the emotional harm suffered. Gener-
ally, privacy is considered a right personal to the plaintiff-that is, a
person cannot sue for invasion of privacy unless it is literally his own
privacy that is invaded.129 As already noted, this is apparently not
the case with negligent infliction actions.130 Beyond such broad com-
parisons, however, it is more useful to examine the relevant strains
of the privacy tort individually.
Privacy actions for intrusion generally emerge from complaints
about the way in which journalists have gone about gathering infor-
mation.131 Publication is not an element of the tort.132 There ap-
pears to be no reason why a given course of conduct cannot lead to a
suit either for intrusion or for negligent infliction, since the latter
also requires no publication. On the other hand, negligent infliction
might encompass a considerably broader range of circumstances than
125. None of the reported cases to date have involved a public-figure or public-offi-
cial plaintiff.
126. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 824-39.
127. See supra notes 99-117 and accompanying text.
128. Prosser is generally credited with this categorization. See PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 9, at 849-69.
129. Id. at 851-66.
130. See supra note 123.
131. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). See also GILL-
MOR & BARRON, supra note 121, at 347; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 807-09.
132. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 854-56.
intrusion, being more applicable to less extreme forms of conduct in
a wider range of places. It might more easily encompass conduct
which, though not physically intrusive, intrudes on a person's mental
solitude.133 Thus far, the courts have not been sympathetic to media
defendants' arguments that the Constitution should provide some de-
gree of defense to intrusion actions. 3 4 There is no reason to believe
that negligent infliction defendants will have better luck when suits
emerge from intrusion-like circumstances.
Suits for false light invasion of privacy resemble negligent inflic-
tion suits inasmuch as both can be triggered by published falsehoods
that fall short of being defamatory. Indeed, a publication might even
create an admirable or sympathetic picture of a plaintiff and still be
actionable as either false light or negligent infliction.' 3 5 Both torts
require a showing of some degree of fault. However, the United
States Supreme Court has intervened in false light actions by requir-
ing plaintiffs involved in matters of public interest to prove that the
offensive material was published "with knowledge of its falsity or in
reckless disregard of the truth."136 Negligent infliction plaintiffs face
no such hurdle.
On the other hand, negligent infliction plaintiffs face a larger hur-
dle on the issue of fault than plaintiffs suing for disclosure invasion
of privacy. In fact, fault appears irrelevant in disclosure suits because
the basis of the action is the publication of truthful information. This
distinction, however, is deceptive because disclosure plaintiffs run
squarely into the broadly recognized defense of newsworthiness-if
the information may generally be defined as newsworthy, it will be
immune from a disclosure suit unless the revelation is "so intimate
and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the
community's notions of decency." 3 7 Rarely have plaintiffs been able
133. In some extreme cases, courts have allowed intrusion actions even when the
defendant's conduct occurred in a public place. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 353 F.
Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
134. In the language of the court in Dietemann v. Time, Inc.: "[t]he First Amend-
ment has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts or crimes
committed during the course of newsgathering. The First Amendment is not a license
to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the precincts of another's
home or office." 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
135. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (newspaper arti-
cle discussed impact on family of father's death in a bridge collapse); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967) (magazine published account of play re-enacting hostage situation).
136. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. at 387-88. It may be that the Gertz libel case has
modified this requirement for private-figure false light plaintiffs by substituting a neg-
ligence standard for them, but the Supreme Court has thus far not made that clear.
137. Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 311 U.S. 711
(1940). This standard has been called the unconscionability standard. See Hill, Defa-
mation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1205, 1262 (1976).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 652D (1976).
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to overcome this defensel 3 8 Even if they can, they may be con-
fronted with another hurdle: the first amendment. The Supreme
Court has held that, at least in the context of judicial records, the
first amendment will tolerate no sanction for publication of truthful
information contained in records open to public inspection. 3 9 At this
point, it is safe to say that neither newsworthiness nor the first
amendment has become a broadly recognized defense to negligent in-
fliction actions.140
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In many respects, negligent infliction's closest legal relative may be
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Restate-
ment has influentially defined such liability this way:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emo-
tional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily
harm.
1 4 1
Indeed, intentional infliction and negligent infliction appear intended
to protect the same interest in emotional tranquility. Both encom-
pass conduct broader than mere publication of information, both re-
quire some showing of fault, both appear not to make truth or falsity
a necessarily decisive factor, and both may be used when the defend-
ant's conduct was in fact aimed at a third person.
But there are crucial differences. Intentional infliction requires no
impact or physically manifested harm.142 On the other hand, the
conduct supporting a claim for negligent infliction need not be "out-
rageous," nor must the defendant have intended any harm at all. In
addition, setting the impact and physical manifestation requirements
aside, it remains unclear just how severe a negligent infliction vic-
tim's harm must be. Thus, at least in those states that have liberal-
ized the rules for recovery, negligent infliction may well be the more
attractive theory of liability for plaintiffs.
Analysis thus reveals that negligent infliction can be co-extensive
138. D. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS 238 (1972).
139. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 495.
140. See supra notes 112-117 and accompanying text.
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). For studies of intentional in-
fliction and the mass media, see Mead, Suing Media for Emotional Distress: A Multi-
Method Analysis of Tort Law Evolution, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 24 (1983); Stevens, Media
Tort Liability for Emotional Distress, 54 JOURNALISM Q. 157 (1977); Drechsel, supra
note 7.
142. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 64.
with the torts of libel and invasion of privacy, and can encompass
conduct broader than that reached by either of them. It also can
cover conduct far broader than that which would support an action
for intentional infliction. In fact, almost any imaginable type of jour-
nalistic faux pas could trigger a negligent infliction suit. States seem
to be moving inexorably toward liberalized rules for recovery for a
tort which already has a relatively undemanding fault requirement.
At the same time, the legal concept of journalistic duty remains
rather dangerously unsettled.143 Consequently, there would appear
to be a real risk that conduct previously in the realm of journalistic
ethics alone might become vulnerable to legal scrutiny.144 At the
same time, negligent infliction, with its lower fault requirement,
could create a loophole through which plaintiffs who might obviously
be foreclosed from success on other theories of liability could still
succeed. An inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that as they have
developed and are developing, the rules of recovery for negligent in-
fliction do not strike an appropriate balance between safeguarding
expression and protecting the interest in emotional tranquility.
V. RESOLVING THE PROBLEM
It is important to recognize at the outset that there is no need, and
no justification, for cutting off all redress for negligent infliction of
emotional distress for all types of plaintiffs against all types of de-
fendants. Indeed, there may well be contexts in which free expres-
sion causes horrible emotional distress which any reasonable
assessment of interests would conclude should be redressed.145 But
in the context of suits against the mass media-particularly for jour-
nalistic content, information, and gathering conduct-legal redress
143. See supra notes 75-92 and accompanying text.
144. Such situations are not difficult to imagine. See, e.g., C. CHRIsTIANs, K.
RorzoLL & M. FACKLER, MEDIA ETHics (1983); J. HULTENG, THE MESSENGER'S MO-
TIVES (1976); Council Warns that New Laws May Restrict Crime Reporting, QuILL,
Dec. 1983, at 43-44 (National News Council Report); Coleman, A Day in the Life,
QUILL, July-Aug. 1983, at 22; Goodwin, The Ethics of Compassion, QuILL, Nov. 1983, at
38; Hart & Johnson, Fire Storm in Missoula, QUILL, May 1979, at 19. The reality of the
risk is well illustrated by Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983). See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
Media defendants ought also to consider their conceivable vulnerability under the spe-
cial relationship rule discussed supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. One can en-
vision, for example, an unhappy source arguing that the existence of a state
journalist's shield statute has created a special relationship, and thus c legal obligation
of duty, between a journalist and source.
145. Examples might include inappropriate conduct by debt collectors, or even cir-
cumstances such as those leading to Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616
P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text. It
may also be appropriate to allow recovery from the media for intentional infliction.
See Drechsel, supra note 7.
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should be limited lest media defendants must fear being sued for al-
most everything they do.
One way of resolving the problem might be to somehow clearly
spell out precisely what legal duties the media has, or perhaps simply
to conclude that none exists. But duty is a slippery concept, and
there is no justification for immunizing the mass media from negli-
gent infliction suits simply because it is the mass media. A far better
solution focuses not on who the defendant is, but on the type of ex-
pression and conduct for which protection is sought. The following
principles would do precisely that:
1. In any action alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress, when a
plaintiff's only alleged harm is emotional, or where physical harm has al-
legedly resulted from emotional distress alone, a plaintiff may not recover
damages or seek any other remedy for such harm when the conduct al-
leged to have caused the harm
a. was a statement, information or image published in connection with an
event or issue of public or general interest; or
b. was the act of obtaining a statement, information or image in connec-
tion with an event or issue of public or general interest; or
c. would otherwise be privileged under any other theory of liability as-
serted by the plaintiff or clearly and directly relevant to the conduct.
2. The burden shall be on the plaintiff to prove with convincing clarity that
the subject of the conduct was not an event or issue of public or general
interest.
3. If a defendant believes that a theory of liability not explicitly asserted by
the plaintiff is relevant in view of the complained of conduct, and that
conduct would be privileged under that theory of liability, the defendant
may assert such privilege, provided that the defendant bears the burden of
proof that the theory of liability is clearly and directly relevant to the de-
fendant's conduct.1 4 6
These principles partially transplant the public interest criterion
used by the United States Supreme Court in Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia147 and Time, Inc. v. Hill148 in order to erect a strong and
146. These guidelines were developed by the author.
147. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Rosenbloom was a plurality libel decision in which the
Court extended first amendment protection from libel suits to defendants who had
published material concerning an issue of public or general concern. In such situa-
tions, plaintiffs-regardless of whether they were public officials, public figures or pri-
vate figures-were required to prove "actual malice," i.e., that the libelous statement
was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). In Gertz
418 U.S. 323 (1974), the court rejected this approach, concluding that private figures
should be able to win upon a showing of negligence. But negligent infliction is not li-
bel, and there is no reason to expect the reasoning of Gertz to be controlling in negli-
gent infliction cases.
148. 385 U.S. at 387-88. The case extended the "actual malice" standard of New
York Times v. Sullivan to false light privacy suits. Particularly relevant to the present
study is the Court's remark in Hill that a negligence test "would place on the press the
intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps
broad newsworthiness defense to negligent infliction actions.149
Clearly, the intent is to deal with privilege situations, whether they
involve the gathering or publication of material, where emotional dis-
tress has been caused by a nonphysical stimulus.
Implicit in the suggested principles is the assumption that there is
no legal duty to avoid negligently inflicting emotional distress when
gathering or publishing information of public interest. This assump-
tion is consistent with the argument that "[a]gainst a large part of the
frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident to
participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental
hide is a better protection than the law could ever be."'150 Yet it pur-
posely leaves open redress under narrower theories of liability in-
cluding libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Such causes of action, in addition to encompass-
ing a narrower scope of conduct, also have more appropriate proof re-
quirements and defenses.
The suggested principles incorporate the public interest standard
precisely because of its breadth and strength in limiting actions.151
The principles forbid negligent infliction actions where the defend-
ant's conduct occurs "in connection with" an event or issue of public
interest. Therefore, what matters is not whether the defendant's
conduct, taken in isolation, might be considered of public interest,
but whether the conduct involves an event or issue of public interest.
The distinction can be centrally important. Situations can arise in
which a specific piece of information in and of itself may not be of
public interest, yet clearly involves an event that is. For example,
publication of the name of a sexual assault victim might not, in isola-
taken by it to verify the accuracy of every reference to a name, picture or portrait."
Id. at 389.
149. Further, and quite intentionally, this standard may also apply to much adver-
tising, an application consistent with the United States Supreme Court's increased pro-
tection of commercial speech. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (New York law prohibiting electric utility from ad-
vertising to promote use of electricity violated first and fourteenth amendments); Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (Virginia statute prohibiting advertisement of drug prescription prices held in-
valid); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (Virginia could not prohibit advertise-
ment for New York abortions).
150. Magruder, supra note 9, at 1035. See also Smith, supra note 9, at 247-48. Sev-
eral observers have suggested different approaches to handling negligent infliction
claims generally. See Goodrich, supra note 42, at 506 (when physical manifestation re-
sults, recovery allowed upon proof of negligence in violation of duty); Nolan & Ursin,
supra note 9, at 609 (required foreseeability and serious emotional distress); Miller,
supra note 9, at 39 (type of damages available restricted); Russo, Malicious, Inten-
tional and Negligent Mental Distress in Florida, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 339, 366-67
(1983) (foreseeability/proximate cause test). None of these writers, however, specifi-
cally address free expression issues.
151. One authority has noted that after the Rosenbloom decision the press "enjoyed
a respite from libel laws." GILLMOR & BARRON, supra note 121, at 224.
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tion, be considered of public interest. But publication of the name-
insensitive though such may be-in connection with coverage of a
criminal case would be publication of information involving an event
of public interest.
The public interest standard also was selected because it does not
make a plaintiff's public or private status directly relevant to recov-
ery.15 2 This is a vitally important provision since negligent infliction
cases may commonly arise over coverage of private persons 53 and be-
cause negligent infliction actions might otherwise be possible by pub-
lic figures and officials who would be precluded from suing
successfully under other theories of liability.54 To make the plain-
tiff's task even more demanding, the suggested principles place on
the plaintiff the burden of proof that the defendant's conduct falls
outside of the protected sphere. Thus, the plaintiff must prove with
convincing clarity'55--not by a mere preponderance of the evidence-
that the conduct did not relate to an event or issue of public or gen-
eral interest.
Under the suggested principles, defenses to libel, invasion of pri-
vacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress become applica-
ble when any such claim might arise from the same conduct as that
which triggers a negligent infliction action.156 At least two reasons
dictate the need for this requirement. First, it helps guarantee that
negligent infliction is a truly independent tort and that it will not be-
come merely a convenient end run around more difficult, but in fact
more appropriate, theories of liability. Second, if a defendant's con-
duct would be privileged under another relevant theory of liability,
the existence of such privilege implies legal recognition of the utility
of the conduct. Under these circumstances, it becomes very clear
that a defendant has no duty not to negligently inflict emotional dis-
152. Conceivably, such status might be indirectly relevant to the degree that in
some cases it might bear on whether or not a borderline situation really was news-
worthy. Nevertheless, the test requires a court to rest its decision on the topic of the
conduct, not on its "victim."
153. Almost all of the extant negligent infliction actions have been brought by pri-
vate figures.
154. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 334-36 (public figure may not recover for defama-
tion unless actual malice or reckless disregard is shown); New York Times, 376 U.S. at
280-81 (public official may not recover for defamation unless knowledge or reckless
disregard is shown).
155. This standard is drawn from the constitutional libel defense established in
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86.
156. Of course, intentional infliction is less relevant because a plaintiff able to re-
cover on an intentional infliction theory need not worry about also being able to prove
negligence.
tress.157 The suggested principles, of course, also make such factors
as reasonableness of conduct and foreseeability of harm irrelevant in
many cases. These concepts are simply inappropriately flexible and
unpredictable.158
The suggested principles are consistent with precedent refusing to
find that the media has a duty to avoid negligent infliction,159 and
with precedent finding other defenses to be relevant in negligent in-
fliction cases.160 They are also consistent with the impact/physical
manifestation requirements in the sense that their intent is to limit
the cause of action significantly and assure that the tort expands, if at
all, under stringent limits. Obviously, the principles conflict with the
expansiveness of such decisions as Rodrigues and Molien and their
progeny in other states.161 Limiting such expansion is precisely the
principles' goal.
Although the suggested principles still allow actions for negligent
infliction alone, and as such are inconsistent with the position of the
Restatement,16 2 they are actually more restrictive than the Restate-
ment in situations where physical harm results from unintentionally
inflicted emotional distress.' 63 The principles are consistent with the
Restatement's view of common law privilege-that a privilege may
be based upon "the fact that its exercise is necessary for the protec-
tion of some interest of the actor or of the public which is of such
importance as to justify the harm caused or threatened by its exer-
cise."164 The overriding interest justifying the privilege is the inter-
est in freedom of expression. Ultimately, then, the principles are
consistent with the first amendment itself, because they allow maxi-
mum media freedom from recovery under a dangerously broad the-
ory of liability.
Applied to the cases already brought against media defendants, the
principles would affirm all of the decisions in favor of defendants,
and require reversal of the defendants' setbacks in Hyde, Parnell, Ru-
binstein and Blinick. The topic of the offensive, and concededly
thoughtless, article in Hyde was a police report of a serious crime;165
157. See generally supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 99-117 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
162. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) refuses to recognize a cause of
action for negligence resulting in emotional distress only.
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965) favors recovery for physical
harm resulting from some unintentionally inflicted emotional distress. The principles
suggested in this study would foreclose recovery in some circumstances for either emo-
tional harm or resulting physical harm.
164. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 10(2)(b) (1964).
165. 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1226 (1983). Hyde
well illustrates how important it is for courts to distinguish carefully between whether
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the photographs in Parnell were published in connection with a story
about local prostitution problems;166 Rubinstein stemmed from a
false death notice;16 7 and Blinick resulted from a wrong telephone
number published in a personals ad.168 Certainly all of these involve
topics of public interest.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has examined in depth the developing tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress and particularly its application to
mass media defendants. The tort, particularly in light of develop-
ments during the past half-dozen years, presents a threat of a danger-
ously broad theory of liability for a wide range of plaintiffs for
conduct which heretofore has been considered only within the realm
of ethics. New limits are necessary to more appropriately balance the
interest in emotional tranquility with the interest in freedom of ex-
pression. Consequently, negligent infliction actions should not be
permitted where the conduct complained of involves an event or is-
sue of public interest. Nor should recovery be permitted where the
conduct would otherwise be privileged under another directly rele-
vant theory of liability.
information is in itself of public interest and whether the event to which the informa-
tion relates is of public interest. The latter should be central, but in Hyde the court
focused on the former and in so doing created a massive problem for the defendants.
166. 572 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Mich. 1983). The decision in a case arising from the
same series of stories, Apostle v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 897 (W.D. Mich.
1983), should be modified so that the negligent infliction action is dismissed with
prejudice.
167. 9 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1581 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1983).
168. 67 Misc. 2d 254, 323 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971).

